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The Effect of Market Structure and Conduct 






In this paper, we examine how market structure and firms’ conduct affect the private 
incentive and welfare effect of a merger. The main result of this paper is as follows. First, as 
market becomes more concentrated, the increase in the joint profit of merging firms becomes 
lower for the case of the same cost savings by a merger. This implies that as market concentration 
increases, it is necessary for a m erger to attain larger cost reduction in order to be profitable. 
Second, the increase in welfare by a merger rises (or, the decrease in welfare by a merger falls) as 
the market structure goes toward competition. Third, As the collusion level among firms becomes 
higher, the increase in the joint profit of merging firms goes down. Fourth, As the collusion 
among firms decreases, the required level of cost savings for a merger to raise welfare also goes 





There has been a lot of research on the private incentive and welfare effect of a 
horizontal merger. For the private profitability of a horizontal merger, the competition type 
(that is, Cournot vs. Bertrand competition) becomes very important. Salant et al. (1983) 
showed that a horizontal merger can be unprofitable by using Cournot model. The main 
reason for this result is due to the response of outsiders. Merging firms usually reduce joint 
output in order to ex ercise market power. In reaction to this event, non-merging firms raise 
output according to their reaction functions, which has a negative influence on merging firms 
since output is a strategic substitute. Contrary to this result, Deneckere and Davidson (1985) 
showed that a merger of any size is privately profitable by using Bertrand model. They 
argued that a merged firm raises its price to raise market power. In response to this, outsiders 
increase their price, which has a positive effect on the profit of a merged firm since price is a 
strategic complement.
1  
Usually a horizontal merger of two firms have mixed effects on welfare because it 
affects market structure and efficiency of firms. The negative side of a merger is that it raises 
market power due to the concentration of a market and positive side of a merger is that it 
may enhance efficiency by synergy effect. Williamson (1968) developed a method by which 
we can evaluate the welfare effect of a merger. He argued that a merger can enhance 
efficiency through some sort of synergy effect. If this efficiency effect is large enough to 
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outweigh market power effect, then a merger can raise social welfare. Farrell and Shapiro 
(1990) derived the condition under which a privately profitable merger is also socially 
desirable. 
In this paper, we are concerned with the question how the private incentive and 
welfare effect of a merger are affected by the change in market structure. Suppose all the 
mergers can attain the same level of cost reduction, then as market structure becomes more 
concentrated, is it more likely (or unlikely) that a merger is privately profitable (or socially 
desirable)? If we can answer for this kind of question, then we can identify the relation 
between market structure and incentive for a merger. Here, we also examine the relation 
between the degree of competitiveness (or collusiveness) and the merger incentive. By this 
analysis, we can see how firms’ conduct in terms of collusion can influence the merger 
incentive. Finally, we see the case where a merger generates a stable cartel. If a cartel is 
induced by a merger, negative welfare effect of a merger becomes dominant and so 
government had better adopt a strict merger allowance policy. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section II, we look at the change in the 
profitability and social desirability of a merger according to the change in market structure 
using Cournot model. In Section III, we introduce the conjectural variation terms in the 
model in order to examine the effect of collusion level on the merger incentive. By this way, 
we investigate how merger incentive is influenced by firms’ conduct such as degree of 
collusion. In Section IV, we show the case where a merger can occur even without cost 
savings in a Cournot model. That is,  we derive the condition under which a merger can 
trigger the formation of a cartel in a repeated game context. In Section V, we summarize 
main results of the paper and point out some limitations of this paper. 
 
II. Market Structure and Merger Incentive 
 
We assume that there are  n  identical firms in the market. Each firm has a constant 
returns to scale technology and has a marginal cost (MC) of  c  at first. The inverse market 
demand is linear;  bQ a P - = , where  P  is the market price and  Q  is the total market 
output. All the firms in market are involved in Cournot competition. We assume that the MC 
of a merged firm goes down from  c  to  c .
2  (where,  , c c <   c c d - = ) Here we would 
like to look at the change in private profitability and social desirability of a merger according 
to the change in market structure. In order to see this, we are going to derive the change in 
the joint profit of merging firms and social welfare by a merger. 
 
1. Pre-merger case   
 
Before a merger, each firm has the same MC of  . c   We can easily derive each firm’s 
Cournot equilibrium output and profit as follows. 
 
2. Salant et al. (1983) showed that a merger lowers joint profit of merging firms for the case of linear demand and 
constant MC using Cournot model. So in order for a profitable merger to happen, it is necessary to assume MC 
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), 1 ( / + = n b qi a
2 2 ) 1 ( / + = P n b i a   (where,  n i c a ..., , 2 , 1 , = - = a )         (1) 
 
2. Post-merger case 
 
We consider the case where (n-1)
th firm and (n-2)
th firm merge into (n-1)
th firm. After a 
merger, a merged firm’s MC becomes  c , while the remaining (n-2) firms have MC’s of  . c  
Then problems of a non-merging firm and a merged firm are as follows. 
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Now by solving (n-1) first order conditions (FOC’s) simultaneously, we get the 
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By using the pre-merger profit and post-merger profit in (1) and (3), we can get the 
change in the joint profit of merging firms by a merger. 
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Now we are in a position to analyze the effect of change in market structure on the 
change in the joint profit of merging firms by the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: Given the same level of cost savings by a merger, if a merger is privately 
profitable when there are  1 n  firms in the market, then it is also privately profitable when 
there are  2 n  firms in the market. (where,  , 2 1 n n < ) 4 ‡ n  JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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Pf) The change in the joint profit of merging firms when the amount of cost savings is  d  is 
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From this equation, we get  ) ( ' n f  as below. 
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So the sign of  ) ( ' n f  is the same as that of  ). (n g  
 
For  , 4 ‡ n   0 ) ( > n g  holds. Therefore  0 ) ( ' > n f  holds.  Q.E.D. 
 
According to the above proposition, with the same level of cost savings, the profit 
increase by a merger becomes lessened as the number of firms decreases. That is, as a market 
becomes more concentrated, it is more difficult for a merger to be privately profitable. We 
can interpret this result as follows. As a market becomes more concentrated, pre-merger 
profit of each firm increases due to the reduction in competition. So large cost savings is 
necessary in order for a merger to raise joint profit of merging firms in this case. In this 
respect, it is more difficult for a merger to occur as market concentration goes up. This kind 
of phenomena has a desirable aspect from the view-points of social welfare. In general, the 
increase in market concentration gives a negative impact on welfare. But, in a concentrated 
market, a merger can occur only when efficiency gain is high enough, which raises the 
possibility that a merger can have a positive welfare effect. 
Next, we would like to see how the market structure affects the welfare effect of a 
merger. In order to examine this, we need to know the change in social welfare by a merger. 
We provide the derivation of this change in the appendix. 
 
Proposition 2: Given the same level of cost savings by a merger, if a merger is socially 
desirable when there are  1 n  firms in the market, then it is also socially desirable when 
there are  2 n  firms in the market. (where,  , 2 1 n n <   ) 3 ‡ n  
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Pf) From the appendix, the change in social welfare by a merger is  
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From the above relation, we get  ) ( ' n f  as below. 
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From the above result, it is true that  0 ) ( > n g  (where,  ). 3 ‡ n  So  0 ) ( ' > n f  holds. 
Q.E.D. 
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The above proposition explains the relation between the change in market structure 
and the welfare effect of a merger. Suppose that the level of cost reduction by a merger is the 
same irrespective of a market structure. Then, as the number of firms increases, the welfare 
increase by a merger becomes larger (or the welfare decrease becomes smaller). Therefore, it 
is possible that a merger lowers welfare for a concentrated market but it raises welfare for a 
more competitive market. So even if the efficiency enhancement effect by a merger is the 
same, it is necessary to adopt different policy direction for a merger depending on the market 
structure. Namely, as the market becomes more competitive, the government policy toward a 
merger needs to be generous. 
 
III. Degree of Competitiveness and Merger Incentive 
 
Until now we assumed that each firm in an industry conjectures that the output of the 






j i q Q ) was assumed. Now we introduce the non-zero conjectural variation 
terms in the m odel to examine how the different degree of competitiveness changes the 
welfare implication of a merger. We assume that  s  does not change before and after a 
merger.
3  In this section, we are going to analyze how the change in competitiveness in terms 
of conduct affects the private incentive for a merger. In the appendix, we derive the change 
in the joint profit of merging firms with non-zero conjectural variation terms. And by using 
this result, we get the following proposition that represents the relation between the degree of 
collusion and the incentive for a merger. 
 
Proposition 3: Given the same level of cost savings by a merger, the increase in the joint 
profit of merging firms becomes lessened (or the decrease in the joint profit b ecomes 
enlarged) as the degree of collusion goes up in the market. 
 
Pf) From the appendix, we have the change in the joint profit of merging firms when the 
conjectural variation is s  as follows. 
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We want to show  0 ) ( ' < s f  
 
 
3. Here, the range of  s that we consider is from 0 to (n-2) because we are interested in the case where the degree 
of collusion is between Cournot behavior and perfect collusion. Also, the upper bound of  s is (n-2) because the 
number of the rival firms for each firm becomes (n-2) after a merger. SHIN: THE EFFECT OF MARKET STRUCTURE AND CONDUCT ON THE INCENTIVE… 
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Now, 
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The above result represents the relation between the degree of competitiveness (or 
collusion) in conduct and private profitability of a merger. Suppose that the amount of cost 
savings are the same irrespective of the competitiveness in a market, then as the intensity of 
cooperation among firms becomes stronger, the private gain by a merger becomes lower. 
Usually, the gain by a merger comes from the increase in market power due to the reduction 
in competition. When the cooperation among firms becomes prevalent in a market, each firm 
already has a significant market power. In this situation, the additional gain by a merger 
becomes lower. This kind of relation has a desirable welfare implication in the following 
respect. That is, from the social welfare view-points, it becomes more difficult to go to the 
worse state (the state where market becomes more concentrated by a merger) from the bad 
state (the state where degree of collusion among firms is large). 
Next, we would like to look at the relation between the degree of collusion and the JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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welfare change of a merger. Since the differentiation of the welfare change on the number of 
firms becomes so complex, we could not get the definite sign. Instead of this, we are going to 
derive the minimum level of cost savings that guarantees the increase in welfare by a merger. 
And by simulation, we will get the relation between the degree of collusion and the required 
cost savings, which gives us indirect information about the relation between the 
competitiveness in conduct and welfare change by a merger. We obtain the following result 
by simulation. (Refer to the Table 1 in appendix.)   
 
Simulation Result 1: As the degree of collusion goes up, the required level of cost savings to 
raise social welfare rises. 
 
We can explain above result as follows. Usually a merger provides a negative effect on 
consumer surplus and positive effect on producer surplus. The positive effect of a merger on 
producer surplus is diminished as s  goes up, because for the high value of  s , each firm 
already got high pre-merger profit by cooperation. Therefore we need more cost savings to 
raise positive effect and to lower negative effect to get a socially desirable merger as s  
goes up. One implication of this result is that even for the case of the same market structure, 
the policy toward a merger needs to reflect the degree of collusion in the market. 
 
IV. Relation between a Merger and Cartel Stability 
 
Until now, we deal with the case where cost reduction is necessary for a merger to be 
profitable. But if a merger induces the industry-wide cartel which was not formed before a 
merger, then a merger can be profitable even without cost savings. The reason why this is 
possible comes from the fact that a merger changes the market structure, which in turn 
affects the condition for the stable cartel in a repeated game context. In the appendix, we 
derive the condition for the stable cartel in an infinitely repeated game. 
 
Proposition 4: As the number of firms decreases, the critical level of discount factor above 
which cartel is stable also decreases. 
 
Pf) From the appendix, the critical discount factor above which cartel is stable when there 
are  n  firms is as follows. 
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According to the above result, as market becomes more concentrated, it is more likely 
that a stable cartel is formed. In some case, it is possible that industry-wide cartel is unstable 
for the competitive market, but it becomes stable for the concentrated market. In this sense, a 
merger can generate a stable cartel which was not formed before a merger because market 
concentration increases due to a merger. Therefore, we need to consider the possibility of 
cartel formation due to a merger as well as market power and efficiency effect. Thus if the 
discount factor is in the range where a stable cartel is formed by a merger, it is necessary to 




Until now, we have examined the following issues; (1) the relation between a market 
structure and the merger incentive, (2) the relation between a degree of competitiveness (or 
collusiveness) in terms of conduct and the merger incentive, (3) the relation between a 
merger and industry-wide cartel formation. We can have some implication for the 
government policy toward a horizontal merger by this kind of analysis. The main result of 
this paper can be summarized as follows. 
First, for the case where the cost reduction by any merger is the same, the increase in 
joint profit of merging firms becomes lower as market becomes more concentrated. Thus, as 
market concentration increases, it is necessary for a merger to attain larger cost reduction in 
order to be privately profitable. This is somewhat good news to the economy since it is more 
difficult for a merger to occur as market structure goes away from the perfect competition. 
Second, for the same cost savings by a merger, the increase in social welfare by a merger 
rises (or the decrease in social welfare falls) as the market structure goes toward competition. 
That is, as market becomes competitive, it is more likely that a merger has a positive effect 
on welfare. Third, the effect of a merger on the joint profit also depends on the degree of 
competition (or collusion) among firms. As the collusion level becomes higher among firms, 
the profitability of a merger goes down. So it becomes more difficult for a merger to come 
out in this case, which reduces the negative effect of a merger. Fourth, As the collusion 
among firms goes down, the required level of cost savings for a merger to raise welfare also 
goes down. So the policy toward a merger needs to consider the degree of collusion in terms 
of firms’ conduct. Fifth, a merger can induce a industry-wide cartel which was not formed 
before a merger. In this case, a merger is always privately profitable even if there is no cost 
savings by a merger, which has a negative effect on welfare. 
One implication of this paper is that the policy toward a merger had better take into 
account the market structure, the type of firms’ conduct and the possibility of cartel 
formation. So even if a merger achieves the same efficiency enhancement, the government 
needs to take different policies depending on the state of market structure and firm’s conduct. 
Finally, limitations of this paper and further research directions can be stated as 
follows. First, we use Cournot model to analyze the merger effect. It would be better to 
check the robustness (or sensitivity) of this result by using another model like Bertrand 
competition. Second, here linear demand and constant returns to scale technology are 
assumed. So we need to see how the result changes as the demand and cost functions are 
generalized. Third, here we deal with the case of symmetric firms. Usually firms in a real JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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market are in asymmetric positions. If we can encompass the case of asymmetric firms, then 
the application of the result can be enlarged. SHIN: THE EFFECT OF MARKET STRUCTURE AND CONDUCT ON THE INCENTIVE… 
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Appendix 
 
1. The derivation of the change in social welfare by a merger   
 
[1] Pre-merger case   
 
Before a merger, we can derive the producer surplus by summing up the pre-merger 




1 ) 1 ( +

























[2] Post-merger case 
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[3] social welfare change by a merger   
 
Now we get the welfare change by a merger by using the results of [1] and [2] as 
follows.   
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2. The derivation of the change in the joint profit of merging firms and social welfare 
when there is a conjectural variation parameter.   
 
[1] pre-merger case   
 
The first order condition for each firm’s maximization problem is as follows. 
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From this condition, we get equilibrium output and profit as follows.   
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th firm merger into a (n-1)
th firm, the problem of a non-merging firm 
and a merged firm is the same as the one given in Equation (2) in Section II.   
The first order condition for this problems is given as below.   
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Now using the (n-1) equations, we get the post-merger output and profit as follows.   
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[3] Change in the joint profit of merging firms and social welfare 
 
Now the change in the joint profit of merging firms is given below.   
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Also, the change in the producer surplus ( PS PS PS
m - = D ) is given below. 
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Next, the change in consumer surplus ( CS CS CS
m - = D ) is given below. 
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} ) ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ((
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Now we get the change in social welfare ( CS PS SW D + D = D ) as follows. 
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Let  l be the minimum  d  that satisfies  . 0 ‡ DSW  Then, the value of  l is 
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3. Simulation result 
 
Now we use the simulation method in order to see the relation between s  and  l 




N  s   l  N  s   l 
3  0  0.0511  8  2  0.0536 
  1  0.1091    3  0.0750 
4  0  0.0334    4  0.0950 
  1  0.0789    5  0.1133 
  2  0.1180    6  0.1299 
5  0  0.0236  9  0  0.0089 
  1  0.0598    1  0.0264 
  2  0.0936    2  0.0459 
  3  0.1229    3  0.0653 
6  0  0.0176    4  0.0837 
  1  0.0470    5  0.1008 
  2  0.0763    6  0.1166 
  3  0.1027    7  0.1311 
  4  0.1261  10  0  0.0074 
7  0  0.0137    1  0.0225 
  1  0.0380    2  0.0398 
  2  0.0634    3  0.0574 
  3  0.0872    4  0.0744 
  4  0.1089    5  0.0904 
  5  0.1283    6  0.1053 
8  0  0.0109    7  0.1192 
  1  0.0314    8  0.1321 
N is the number of firms in the industry.   
s is the conjectural variation parameter. 
l is the required cost savings for a socially beneficial merger. 
a is set to 1. 
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4. The derivation of a critical discount factor for the stable cartel in a repeated game.   
 
We consider the following strategy of each firm in a repeated game; (1) At period  t , 
each firm produces cartel output if no one has deviated from it before period  t . (2) At 
period  t , if some firm has deviated from the cartel output before, then each firm produces 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium output forever. From this strategy, we are going to derive the 
condition for the stability of cartel. 
First, the total cartel output level is equal to monopoly output level. Since there are  n  
identical firms initially, each firm produces  n / 1  of total cartel output and get  n / 1  of the 
total profit;  , 2 / bn q
c
i a =   . 4 /
2 bn
c
i a = P  Now let’s look at the gain that a firm can get by 
deviating from a cartel output. Given that other firms stick to the cartel output level, a defecting 
firm would produce  ) 1 ( 4 / - = n b n q
d
i a  and get  . ) 1 ( 16 /
2 2 2 - = P n b n
d
i a  The one period 
gain by cheating is 




i a  (=A). The present discount value of the 
future loss by defecting, when a discount factor is  d, is 
2 2 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 4 / ) 2 ( n n b n - - - d da  
(=B). A cartel is stable if the loss (B) is greater than the gain (A). Therefore, the range of  d in 
which a cartel is stable is  ). ( ) 1 6 /( ) 1 (
2 2 n n n n c d d = + + + >  SHIN: THE EFFECT OF MARKET STRUCTURE AND CONDUCT ON THE INCENTIVE… 
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